CIA COVER-UP OF PAN AM 103 EXPLOSION

On December 21, 1988, Pan Am Flight 103 was destroyed by a bomb that detonated in the baggage compartment as the plane made its climb out from London passing over Lockerbie, Scotland en route to New York.  A total of 270 people died including 11 residents of the Scottish town.  According to investigators, the bomb was built into a Toshiba radio cassette player and packed in a brown hard-case Samsonite suitcase that was being unlawfully shipped as unaccompanied baggage.  This would later prove to be questionable or planted evidence.

Unraveling this case has been very difficult due to the shadowy players involved who might have had terrorist motives.  Libyan Dictator Col. Gadafy may have been trying to avenge a US air strike against him in 1986.  Iran may have been seeking to avenge the shoot-down of Iran-Air Flight 655 by the US  cruiser Vincennes in July of 1988.   Our own CIA was also deeply involved in drug operations in the Middle East (drug operations are one of the CIA�s main sources of income for black operations in order to avoid budgetary explanations to Congress) as well as trading weapons with Syrian, Palestinian, Libyan, and German terrorists to assist in getting hostages released--something the US claims they never do.

The CIA�s involvement in this tragedy is particularly prominent. They had regular dealings with all the terrorist nations and groups now suspected of the bombing--including Libya. In the Iran-Contra affair the CIA supplied Syrian and Palestinian terrorists with arms in exchange for drugs.  Similarly, while still claiming that Libya was a terrorist nation, the CIA regularly supplied Gadafy with weapons and explosives. When one of its �cut-outs� (an agent being paid through a secret third-party) was arrested for shipping explosives to Libya, the CIA used the standard procedure of simply denying he ever worked for them.  I believe the quid-pro-quo with Libya was that Gadafy agreed to keep his terrorists in check.  The US government wants America reserved for �domestic� terrorism so it can portray the right-wing elements as radical enemies.

Just as the CIA can easily have one of their own agents arrested (when the agent gets queasy about all the illegal activities) simply by tipping off the authorities to an illegal act the CIA assigns an agent to do, they can easily frame any number of cooperating terrorist/drug dealers for acts the CIA itself pays them to perform.  When the CIA has multiple operations going on and is regularly transporting drugs and weapons via civilian airliners, it is easy to finger any number of their partners involved in these transports to take the blame for the CIA�s own purposeful sabotage.  This appears to be what they did in the current attempt to prosecute the two Libyans Abdel Basset Ali al-Megrahi and Lamen Khalifa Fhimah.   These two men have a long history of involvement in black operations, and were most likely involved in some type of drug transshipment known to the CIA.  So it was a simple matter to write them into the script of Pan Am 103 and say they shipped a bomb rather than drugs.

HERE IS THE OFFICIAL GOVERNMENT SCENARIO:

Within days of the 1988 shootdown of Iran-Air 655 in the Persian Gulf, the fundamentalist regime in Tehran gave orders to its surrogates in Syria--led by the renowned terrorist Ahmed Jibril of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP)--to plan an attack on a US airliner.  Jibril�s chief bomb-maker, Marwan Khrecat traveled to Germany and built five bombs into Toshiba portable cassette-radios designed to detonate at altitude, Jibril�s preferred method of operations (MO).  However, in October Khrecat was arrested by German security police who had been tracking his movements.  Conveniently for this version, the police reportedly confiscated one of Khrecat�s Toshiba radio bombs.  Supposedly this is how the CIA is certain the Pan Am bomb was in a Toshiba radio.  The CIA claims that Jibril then went to Col. Gadafy in the fall for help to carry out the plot--which is hardly plausible since Jibril still reportedly  had other bombs made by Khrecat and other terrorist assets available to him in Europe.  It is then claimed that Gadafy tasked two Libyan agents working undercover for Libyan Arab Air in Malta to assemble another Toshiba radio bomb (activated by time delay) and tag it as unaccompanied baggage to Frankfurt with a final destination of New York.  One of the Libyans supposedly left a diary behind to be discovered where he mentioned his intent to tag the luggage (highly unlikely for a trained terrorist who had the expertise to build a sophisticated bomb).  At Frankfurt it is alleged that Jibril�s agents were able to smuggle the suitcase past Pan Am security, still unaccompanied, on the first leg of Pan AM Flight 103 to Heathrow (London) where it continued on to New York.

This was the official version in 1991, but it was full of holes.  Since it was against regulations for such unaccompanied baggage to be allowed on Pan Am, the probability of the suitcase getting through two separate security checks was slim.  Obviously they couldn�t have used an altitude triggering device so it is presumed that they used a timer.  Conveniently the CIA claims to know the type and manufacturer of the timer by a fragment of a circuit board found a year after the crash in the pocket of a piece of clothing (if you can believe that).  The CIA was making furtive contacts with this same Swiss timer company 8 days after the crash, so the claim tying this Swiss timer to forensic evidence found a year later is suspicious.  Of course, the Swiss company sold several to the Libyans, but they also sold hundreds to others as well which have turned up in terrorist arsenals.   The whole timer theory is suspect because of the difficulty in estimating where the suitcase was going to be when it went off.

Enter version #2:

Now the CIA claims that the Libyans still planned the attack and built the bomb but got Jibril to induce a Lebanese-American named Khalid Jafaar to check the suitcase onboard, telling him it was a heroin shipment.  The young Jafaar was part of a major Syrian drug dynasty operating out of the Bekaa valley and was accustomed to such assignments.  In Jafaar�s mind, getting the heroin into the US was no problem since the CIA had Mafia contacts throughout the Kennedy Airport system that could divert the baggage around customs inspectors.   Jafaar, according to Lester Coleman, ex-CIA/DEA whistleblower and author of �Trail of the Octopus,� was also working for the CIA. While stationed in the DEA Cypress office, he had seen Jafaar there, so he knew he was a CIA asset.  When Coleman challenged the official version in his book, he found himself under indictment for a passport violation (using an alias assigned him by the CIA) and had to flee the country.   Under government persuasion, no US publisher would touch the book.  

The official CIA response to Coleman�s charges and its normal cover for its secret drug operations was the term, �controlled delivery.�  Ostensibly, in order to catch all the participants in a giant drug ring, the CIA allows a �few� drug shipments on board civilian airlines in order to trace how it gets into the US.   However, Coleman and others in the DEA couldn�t help but notice that a much greater quantity was being allowed to go through than would be necessary for a sting operation.  In addition many military pilots and ground operations personnel have discovered large quantities of drugs moving even on military cargo aircraft--which certainly couldn�t have qualified as �controlled delivery� or a sting operation.

In any case, one German baggage handler claims the CIA told them to let it through without checking.  The CIA has admitted to this specific practice before, but claim they didn�t have any such operations in December of 1988 (plausible deniability at work).  This is false.  There is other testimony that on 21 December the CIA sent two brown "Samsonite" suitcases from Berlin via Frankfurt to Seattle in a drug operation called �Korea.�  One of these suitcases was subsequently discovered in Lockerbie, the other one did arrive in Seattle on a different flight.  Is it only coincidence  that the CIA uses the same kind of brown �Samsonite� suitcases that terrorist bombers use?

Even more ominous are the stories coming from Scottish police and investigators claiming they were prohibited from going through the wreckage in Lockerbie for two days while CIA and FBI plainclothes agents feverishly searched through and hauled off numerous pieces of baggage.  They were then threatened if they revealed anything about the US interference.  So, some big questions remain: what was the CIA trying to recover that was so sensitive? and did the CIA know it was heroin or a bomb when it gave instructions to let the suitcase pass in Frankfurt?    Heroin was also found among the wreckage, so obviously both drugs and a bomb were on the plane. 

DID THE US GOVERNMENT KNOW THE PLANE WAS DOOMED?

As in the OKC bombing case, there is evidence here that certain government personnel were warned in advance to cancel reservations on Pan Am 103.  At least two warnings about a bomb on a US airliner  came through the FAA and various agencies in Germany.  Here is a partial list of US and South African officials who suddenly backed out of flight 103 to New York: John McCarty, US ambassador; Steve Green, assistant administrator, office of intelligence DEA; Oliver Revell, son of Buck Revell, FBI-head investigation for the Lockerbie case; John McCarty, US ambassador to Cyprus; Pik Botha, the former South African foreign minister (who sold out SA to the globalists); and Botha�s entire delegation of 22 persons, including General Mallon, Defense Minister, and General Van Tonda, head of the South African Secret Service (BOSS).

Enter scenario #3:    

Strangely, one group of the CIA�s own, a Middle East team who had knowledge of CIA illegal drug and weapons operations, was not warned.  CIA agents Charles McKee, Matthew Kevin Gannon, Daniel Emmet O'Connor and Ronald Albert Lariviere died in the explosion of Fight PA-103.   At least one source from within the government has claimed that McKee and his team had complained about CIA weapons shipments to Syrian terrorists as well as about the large quantities of drugs the CIA was facilitating for shipment to the US.  Higher-ups in the CIA had allegedly tried to stonewall their demands for answers (as has been the case in several other documented cases involving drug operations in the military and the DEA).  In frustration they were flying home on their own accord, against orders, to present evidence to Congress.  It is my opinion that the CIA likely considered them a substantial threat, and chose to eliminate them before they could reach the US.  

If true, this is a story that will never see the light of day in the mainstream press.  Due to space considerations in this brief I have left out myriad details relative to the so-called forensic evidence against the two Libyan patsies.  There are books full of troubling data on this issue, pointing out the CIA�s fantastic claims (e.g. clothing inside the bomb suitcase miraculously surviving the blast so that it can be traced to a single shop in Malta).  The conclusions I have drawn are my own.  It�s relatively easy to come to other conclusions due to the CIA�s entanglement in drugs and all the main suspects, including terrorists.  But I have learned over long experience that the story the government tries to suppress the most is usually closer to the truth.  Other bits and pieces will undoubtedly leak out from time to time, but my basic suspicion that the CIA was silencing a group of its own whistleblowers probably won�t change.   Of one thing I am certain.  The dark side of the US government is so deeply involved in illicit activities and is so intent on keeping them secret that they will stoop to almost any means to suppress the truth.